This report examines Japan’s evolving defense and security policies within the context of intensifying regional and global challenges, focusing on its role in the Indo-Pacific and expanding partnerships with Europe and NATO.
Japan perceives its strategic environment as becoming increasingly unstable. It has identified several major risks to its national security: North Korea’s advanced missile program, China’s militarization of the East and South China Seas, and Russia’s destabilizing regional activities. In fact, for Japan, the invasion of Ukraine is not solely an issue of Euro-Atlantic security but has further underscored the interconnected nature of global security, amplifying Japan’s concerns over a potential conflict in the Taiwan Strait. Former Prime Minister Fumio Kishida’s assertion that “Ukraine today may be East Asia tomorrow” emphasizes Japan’s position on what it considers shared vulnerabilities, and its determination to proactively bolster both regional and global security frameworks.
Under Kishida, Japan has therefore enacted transformative defense reforms, including the 2022 National Security Strategy, National Defense Strategy, and Defense Buildup Plan. These call for the doubling of defense spending by 2027. This includes targets such as expanding cyber and electronic warfare capabilities and acquiring counterstrike weapons. These measures represent a significant departure from Japan’s postwar defense posture. Public opinion has shifted noticeably in favor of this policy direction, with recent polling indicating a diminishing pacifist sentiment and increasing approval for broader international security partnerships.
In this context, Japan has pursued deeper engagement with NATO and European partners, emphasizing shared values such as a “rules-based international order”, and seeking to enhance collaboration in areas including maritime security, cybersecurity, and defense technology. Japan’s role as a member of the “Indo-Pacific Four” highlights how it considers the diversification of security partnerships a priority. However, the realization of these partnerships remains constrained by NATO’s limited capacity-building efforts in the Indo-Pacific and internal divisions within Europe regarding the scope of engagement in the region.
While the U.S.-Japan alliance remains central to Japan’s defense strategy, this reliance also has vulnerabilities, particularly in terms of intelligence, logistics, and access to advanced military technology. To address these dependencies, Japan has prioritized co-developing defense capabilities with European nations and existing multilateral security forums, such as the AUKUS partnership, and diversifying its security relationships, particularly through its Free and Open Indo-Pacific (FOIP) strategy. Through this approach Japan is not only attempting to strengthen its strategic autonomy, but also to project itself as a proactive contributor to regional and global stability.
Japan’s engagement with ASEAN and Pacific Island nations further illustrates its commitment to cultivating partnerships beyond traditional security frameworks. Through infrastructure development, maritime capacity-building, and disaster resilience initiatives, Japan has sought to counterbalance China’s growing regional influence while presenting itself as a reliable and trusted partner in the Indo-Pacific.
This report concludes that Japan’s strategy of deepening cooperation with Europe and NATO, while simultaneously reinforcing its alliance with the United States, underscores its departure from a solely defensive posture. In conclusion, Japan has shifted to, what it considers, a more proactive safeguarding of regional stability while it confronts worsening global security challenges.